Pricing Mechanism With Noncooperative Game and Revenue Sharing Contract in Electricity Market.

In this paper, a pricing mechanism is proposed for the electricity supply chain, which is consisting of one generation company (GC), multiple consumers, and competing utility companies (UCs). The UC participates in electricity supply chain management by a revenue sharing contract (RSC). In the electricity supply chain, the electricity real-time balance has an important role in the stable operation of the power system. Therefore, we introduce the demand response into the electricity supply chain to match supply with demand under forecast errors. Hence, we formulate a noncooperative game to characterize the interactions among the multiple competing UCs, which set the retail prices to maximize their profits. Besides, the UCs select their preferred contractual terms offered by the GC to maximize its profits and coordinate the electricity supply chain simultaneously. The existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (NE) are examined, and an iterative algorithm is developed to obtain the NE. Furthermore, we analyze the RSC that can coordinate the electricity supply chain and align the NE with the cooperative optimum under the RSC. Finally, numerical results demonstrate the superiority of the proposed model and the influence of market demand disruptions on the profits of the UCs, GC, and supply chain.